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CONSTITUTIONS, CULTURE, AND HISTORY 
MICHAL JAN ROZBICKI* 
  Governments, like clocks, go from motion the men give them; and as 
governments are made and moved by men, so by them they are ruined too.1 
The relationship between constitutional law and social reality remains a 
fairly grey area of knowledge, mainly because studying it requires efforts that 
move well beyond the separated methods employed internally by law, political 
science, anthropology, history, sociology, communication, and other academic 
disciplines that, collectively, might shine new light on it. At the same time, a 
deeper understanding of this field is vital to scholarship on international and 
comparative law, as well as to legal history, because of the need to understand 
how cultural context supplies meaning to legal texts. Two papers presented at 
the “Invisible Constitutions: Culture, Religion and Liberty” symposium at the 
Saint Louis University School of Law, “The Relevance of African Culture in 
Building Modern Institutions and the Quest for Legal Pluralism” by Semahagn 
Abebe,2 and “Bringing Comparison Home: A Components Approach to 
Culture in Comparative Law” by Monica Eppinger,3 offer important and useful 
theoretical reflections about the nature of this relationship. 
Abebe’s specific question is what to do with the seeming incompatibility 
between what he calls informal and formal institutional systems of social 
organization and governance in Africa, but his larger query is essentially about 
the conditions for a successful marriage between modern constitutionalism and 
existing, historically established cultures.4 An accurate answer would be of 
serious significance not only for the future political development of African 
states, but also for the continuing debates about the nature of globalization, 
 
* Professor, Department of History, and Director of the Center for Intercultural Studies at Saint 
Louis University. 
 1. William Penn, Charter of Liberties and Frame of Government of the Province of 
Pennsylvania (May 5, 1682), reprinted in COLONIAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: 
A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 274 (Donald S. Lutz ed., 1998). 
 2. Semahagn Abebe, The Relevance of African Culture in Building Modern Institutions and 
the Quest for Legal Pluralism, 57 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 429 (2013). 
 3. Monica Eppinger, Sages, Savages and Other Speech Act Communities: Culture in 
Comparative Law, 57 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 407 (2013). 
 4. Abebe, supra note 2, at 430–31. 
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most recently reignited by the popular liberation movements in the Middle 
East. 
To begin reflecting on the prospects of such an answer, it is useful to 
consider the phrase “transition to democracy.” It has been gushingly used in 
Western media over the past three decades whenever an authoritarian regime 
had collapsed.5 Whether such events took place in Russia and Eastern Europe, 
Tunisia, Libya, or Egypt, the premise behind this cliché is a manifestly 
deterministic notion that a universalized, modern, Western-style democracy 
must be the preordained trajectory of development for all these countries. But 
democracy is not a cosmic axiom. It is not something that already exists out 
there and only needs to be unwrapped and put into action by removing 
obstacles to its flourishing. It is a historically developed, man-made product. 
For example, modern American democracy was not created deus ex machina 
in 1776; it took over two centuries of halting, often painful, experiences to 
become an egalitarian and inclusive system.6 Those who today fetishize the 
Constitution’s presumably modern and democratic “original intent” as timeless 
neglect the fact that not only the Constitution but also the original intent had a 
history, and when viewed in the context of that history this intent was not to 
include all people under the umbrella of rights and liberties. Such inclusion 
took place only when gradual culture change—stretching over two centuries—
made full equality conceivable and actionable. 
If democracy in formerly non-democratic countries is to succeed, its 
advocates need to draw conclusions from its historicism. Cultural space to 
accommodate it must first be created if its constitutional codifications are to be 
successfully implemented in real life. That is a slow and complex process, 
because a powerful obstacle stands in the way—the very nature of cultures. 
Cultures are products of long, collective experiences of a people. Cultures 
make sense of people’s lives, and provide stability and order in the chaos of 
existence. They consist largely of self-evident, taken-for-granted assumptions, 
which would explain why they tend to spontaneously resist changes to such 
assumptions. In fact, they may even be viewed as mechanisms for surviving 
change, and they best serve this purpose when they are reliably stable. This is 
why incompatibilities between different cultures with distinct histories behind 
 
 5. See, e.g., Shadi Hamid, A Crisis of Legitimacy, N.Y. TIMES, (Oct. 20, 2011, 11:41 AM), 
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/10/07/is-egypt-losing-its-regional-power/how-
long-is-egypts-transition-to-democracy; Seth Mydans, Burmese General Says Transition to 
Democracy Will Be Slow, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2002, at 7; Nepal Picks New Prime Minister, in 
Transition to Democracy, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 1991, at A9. 
 6. U.S. CONST. amend. I (establishing freedom of speech, religion, and assembly), U.S. 
CONST. amend. VI (establishing the rights of the accused in a criminal trial), U.S. CONST. amend. 
XIII (abolishing slavery), U.S. CONST. amend XIX (giving women the right to vote). 
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them are not anomalies—as the widely used concept of ethnocentrism might 
imply—but are inherent to the very ontology of cultures. 
Yet, cultures are constantly faced with change—brought about by 
migrations, wars, trade, colonization, economic developments, or 
transformations of ecological environment. It is therefore convenient to 
conceptualize them in terms of perennial tensions between the tendency to 
preserve their structures and the necessity of adapting to new situations. The 
resulting adjustment is a product of the contest between these two forces, and it 
is not cost-free, something that may not be immediately apparent to post-
modern, Western societies, where freely choosing an exotic cuisine, a dress 
style, or even a church seems natural and self-evident. Adopting new ways 
usually involves the demise—every so often painful—of old ways. 
Democracy and democratic constitutions, like other cultural products, are 
results of peculiar configurations of collective experiences over long periods of 
time. Such products are stored in cultures’ resource banks as capital. The 
informal systems of governance in Africa that Abebe is referring to are rooted 
in cultural patterns preceding the colonial era—in the role of the elders and 
their mediating functions, local organization of society, community consensus-
building, traditional justice, ethnic values, and religious beliefs.7 By contrast, 
the formal systems, instituted during the post-decolonization period, are 
usually Western-modeled, liberal constitutions, with elections, separation of 
powers, and parliamentary, administrative and judicial structures based on 
European models.8 The latter systems were originally introduced as antitheses 
of traditional, local ways, understood as impediments to modernization.9 
Because these local ways were not taken into account when the liberal polities 
were being introduced, anomalous configurations were created as the top-
down, quasi-Westernization—without corresponding economic and social 
modernization—generated tensions between imported (“visible”) innovations 
and traditional (“invisible”) localism.10 The result was that patterns of 
citizenship and social order became incoherent, opening the way to a variety of 
authoritarian regimes clad in nominally liberal, Western constitutional 
 
 7. Abebe, supra note 2, at 436–41. 
 8. Id. at 433; C.I.A., Botswana, THE WORLD FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/library/publi 
cations/the-world-factbook/geos/bc.html (last updated Oct. 4, 2012); C.I.A., Namibia, THE 
WORLD FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/wa.html 
(last updated Oct. 16, 2012); C.I.A., South Africa, THE WORLD FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/ 
library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sf.html (last updated Oct. 4, 2012); C.I.A., Zambia, 
THE WORLD FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ 
za.html (last updated Oct. 4, 2012). 
 9. Abebe, supra note 2, at 430. 
 10. Id. at 433. 
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structures.11 These post-colonial systems, as Abebe points out, resembled 
neither traditionally African cultural ways nor modern democratic practices. 
I believe that the most creative part of Abebe’s thesis is that it turns the old 
argument in the debate over tradition versus modernity on its head. He rejects 
the rejection of modern liberal values as alien and incompatible with local 
traditions, and he rejects the rejection of traditional African practices as 
inherently un-liberal.12 Instead, he points to certain ingredients in traditional 
African ways—such as community councils and mediation of elders (both 
based on reconciliation and consensus building rather than majority vote)—
that are indigenous, yet consistent in certain ways with broad liberal values.13 
As such, they could potentially serve as stepping stones to designing 
democratic political systems that are tailored to African cultures.14 In other 
words, he shows that these traditional ways hold a huge advantage in that they 
are already part of the existing cultural capital—a source of group identity and 
a social glue to African societies—and so have the power of prior acceptance 
and respect indispensable for any constitutional law to be effective. He has 
thus articulated something that is intellectually very timely in this post-post-
colonial stage of history. Democracy in Somaliland and Botswana does not 
have to be the same as in Paris or London, but it should endeavor to promote 
democratic values. At the same time, invocations of local, customary forms of 
governance do not have to be mere cloaks for authoritarian regimes to hide 
behind. Abebe has formulated a challenge for a new generation of African 
legal and political leaders: devise new, pluralistic constitutions that fuse 
modernity with traditional cultural practices in ways that can contribute to the 
success of such hybrid models as democracies.15 
Some of the newest scholarship on Western political and cultural history 
provides evidence to bolster such thinking. There has recently been a growing 
curiosity about traditional, popular, and local ways of participating in 
governing before political involvement became wholly identified with 
centralized states and modern constitutions.16 For instance, in the United 
States, the two dominant historiographical schools, consensus and progressive, 
still identify—wrongly, as I argue elsewhere—the American Revolution as a 
radical shift from monarchic to egalitarian society; the former seeing the 
founders as fully modern, and the latter denouncing them for betraying their 
 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. at 442. 
 13. Id. at 432. 
 14. Id. at 442. 
 15. Abebe, supra note 2, at 446. 
 16. See, e.g., MICHAL JAN ROZBICKI, CULTURE AND LIBERTY IN THE AGE OF THE 
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 120–31 (Jan Ellen Lewis et al. eds., 2011); BARBARA CLARK SMITH, 
THE FREEDOMS WE LOST 206 (2010). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2013] CONSTITUTIONS, CULTURE, AND HISTORY 451 
presumably modern ideals.17 But now some scholars are taking another look. 
Barbara Clark Smith has shown not only that significant forms of participatory 
liberty did exist before the Revolution, but that they offered more opportunities 
for ordinary people than they would have after the establishment of the new 
republic.18 What she claims is that people were not so much less free, as 
differently free, and those earlier freedoms of colonial subjects involved 
substantial popular participation in public affairs, practices that declined after 
the Revolution.19 Common people regularly served on juries, joined crowds 
that helped embrace or protest royal edicts, and ensured the laws were enforced 
at community level at a time when no professional police forces existed.20 
These traditions were actually widely utilized by the American Revolutionary 
leaders to gain support for their cause, but once these leaders became the 
governing political elite, they distanced themselves from many such traditions, 
fearing that “mobocracy” would undermine their preeminence.21 Grassroots 
participation soon became much more mediated and filtered, in keeping with 
the Madisonian design.22 
There is a certain analogy and a lesson here. Many authoritarian rulers in 
Africa fear traditional, local institutions as rivals to centralized power, and yet 
find themselves appealing to them by attacking Western liberal values, and by 
assuming the mantle of spokesmen for traditional ways.23 They do so precisely 
because these institutions hold tangible and significant cultural power—the 
power to create an acceptable, ordered space where people feel at home. This 
is why Abebe’s argument about harnessing this cultural authority in the service 
of democracy makes so much sense.24 
I have only one quibble with his line of argumentation. He brings up the 
“universality of democratic values” as a point of reference, a premise that 
seems to be at variance with his overall conclusions.25 It undermines the thrust 
of his thesis, to liberate us from the old frameworks of thinking about 
democratic constitutionalism as a one-size-fits-all, timeless arrangement with a 
teleological trajectory. There may be parallels between democratic values in 
different cultures, but there are no universals of liberty. No one is born with 
democratic values any more than one is born with the idea of trial by jury or 
the electric bulb. They all have a history. Someone had to invent them. This 
 
 17. ROZBICKI, supra note 166, at 120–31. 
 18. SMITH, supra note 16, at 206. 
 19. Id. at xi. 
 20. Id. at 18–46. 
 21. Id. at xiii–xiv. 
 22. Id. at 184, 207. 
 23. Abebe, supra note 2, at 446. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 435. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
452 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 57:447 
historicity of cultures and constitutions is a fact that any related analysis needs 
to appreciate. 
In fact, it was the assumption of automatic universality of Western 
democracy that had caused problems in the first place. One only need recall the 
early UNESCO doctrine of “civilizing progress,” a concept unambiguously 
based on universalized Western values, and aimed at unifying world societies 
under its banner, rather than paying attention to the protection and preservation 
of deeply rooted cultural identities among non-Western peoples.26 A number of 
contemporary African decolonization leaders—such as Kwame Nkrumah in 
Ghana and Jomo Kenyatta in Kenya—had studied at European universities and 
tried to implement in their decolonizing countries constitutional models that 
were products of Western historical experiences.27 Yet, old, pre-colonial 
customs, deeply embedded in local cultures, endured because they continued to 
make sense to people.28 This is why investing existing, local, cultural capital 
into the production of modern, liberal, and political practices carries a promise 
of success—it enables people to utilize culturally legitimated interpretative 
tools they already possess to domesticate the new ways. 
While Abebe deals with problems of integrating new political and legal 
structures into existing cultural systems, Monica Eppinger’s essay looks at the 
methodological and theoretical instruments for interpreting the relationship 
between culture and law.29 She specifically considers the efficacy of using the 
tools of linguistic anthropology to respond to the critical question of how 
constitutions constitute; that is how language, including legal language, creates 
reality for people.30 This is a very timely issue, for at least two reasons. First, 
legal scholars rarely take this approach because they tend to focus on the legal 
text’s presumed internal indicators of meaning. The proposed methods thus 
carry a promise of freeing them from the traditional confines of originalism 
and textualism. Second, disciplining these tools into a usable analytical 
framework is a worthy goal because current usages of the term “culture” have 
become too capacious and imprecise. 
Her propositions derive from postmodern epistemologies that reject 
structuralist, unifying belief in cultures as systems of linked signs.31 This 
rejection of totalizing ideas as unknowable has led to an emphasis on 
probability, relativity of meaning, difference, and the construction of reality by 
 
 26. CLAUDE LÉVI-STRAUSS, RACE AND HISTORY 30–33, 46–49 (1952). 
 27. Edmond J. Keller, Decolonization, Independence, and the Failure of Politics, in AFRICA 
156, 160–61 (Phyllis M. Martin & Patrick O’Meara eds., 1995). 
 28. Phyllis M. Martin & Patrick O’Meara, Africa: Problems and Perspectives, in AFRICA 3, 
7–9 (Phyllis M. Martin & Patrick O’Meara eds., 1995). 
 29. See generally Eppinger, supra note 3. 
 30. Id. at 415–20. 
 31. Id. at 420–-23. 
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means of symbolic communication.32 These methods—now a half century 
mature and still evolving—continue to carry considerable potential for fresh 
interpretations of the bonds between law and culture.33 They helped to 
eliminate outdated and arbitrary approaches like Marxian determinism, or 
Levi-Straussian deep and timeless structures. A concept of constructed, 
instituted meanings has been instrumental in replacing logocentric discourses 
that rigidly rested on the assumption that words are reflections of a stable, 
objective reality.34 To mention one example, scholars have spent decades 
arguing—otherwise rightly—that exceptionalism as an arc of history unique to 
America did not objectively exist.35 Only recently they began to understand 
that American exceptionalism consists of widespread consciousness of 
exceptionalism, and, accordingly, shifted their interpretative efforts to such 
subjectivities.36 Postmodern epistemology is also valuable in its insistence on 
our limitations—by raising the awareness that scholars are an inalienable part 
of their cultures—and that the way they represent things not only structures the 
depicted reality but also reflects their authors as much, if not more, as their 
subjects.37 
In her argument, Eppinger largely limits herself to the sphere of language, 
taking her cues from linguistics and semiotics, especially from John Austin’s 
theory of performative speech acts as social actions.38 Because such acts must 
operate within conventions (frameworks of what is possible and thinkable) and 
require authority to create social reality, she recommends them as useful 
prisms through which to interpret the ways in which constitutions—when 
treated as categories of communicative action—constitute social reality.39 She 
also enlists practice theory and Irving Goffman’s micro-sociological theory of 
performance as a communicative exchange between the actor and the observer 
to elaborate on the performative strength of speech acts.40 She makes the case 
that the ability of speech acts to constitute social inclusion and exclusion, 
authority, and cultural reproduction make them effective tools of interpreting 
the impact of constitutions on different communities (one of the concerns of 
 
 32. Id. at 418–20. 
 33. Id. at 415–20. 
 34. See Eppinger, supra note 3, at 415–20. 
 35. See generally Peter Onuf, American Exceptionalism and National Identity, in 1 
AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT 77 (2012). 
 36. Id. at 79–80. 
 37. Jerry Topolski, A Non-postmodernist Analysis of Historical Narratives, in 41 POZNAN 
STUDIES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE AND THE HUMANITIES 9, 9 (Jerzy Brzeziński et al. eds., 
1994). 
 38. Eppinger, supra note 3, at 418–20. 
 39. Id. at 419–20. 
 40. Id. at 417. 
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comparative law).41 Eppinger’s reasoning is articulate, sophisticated, and 
elegant. It is also judicious; for instance, with an eye on the usefulness of the 
methods for interpreting constitutions, she appropriately identifies and discards 
the static character of Goffman’s performance theory, and corrects his error 
with more recent understandings of continuous cultural reproduction.42 
Nonetheless, cultures have more dimensions than the linguistic and the 
performative. With all their seductively fertile explanatory advantages, these 
two approaches have certain limitations that deserve our attention. First, the 
focus on language and communication should not mean that socio-economic 
factors are excluded from the analysis. This, of course, is often easier said than 
done because poststructuralist theory tends to be allergic to macro-scale 
concepts.43 Second, the same theory strongly stresses the independence of 
language from its outside referents, but lived experience also involves realities 
that are more than mere perceptions of experience. Even if one accepts that 
there is no knowable, independent, absolutely objective reality, not everything 
can be thought of in terms of imagined realities—even if so much of culture 
rests on them. To use an example once offered by Susan Sontag, cancer—
when it occurs in lived experience—is just a disease, and not a metaphor of 
anything.44 Third, the relativism of meanings need not be absolute. The 
number of meanings that words can take is not infinite, as some of the scholars 
quoted by Eppinger have claimed.45 Auschwitz was Auschwitz—it cannot be 
read to mean “cumulus clouds” or “Hawaiian vacation.” 
To put it another way, we should be wary of pursuing too much of a 
laissez-faire, de-centered, micro-scale analysis, because this kind of inquiry is 
eminently capable of not only atomizing knowledge, but also of paralyzing 
systemic thought. The very talk of systemic patterns can bring about charges of 
naïve realism and of essentializing the concept of culture (two real dangers, but 
currently also serving as liturgical terms used to signal a lack of theoretical 
sophistication).46 Anthropology and behavioral sciences are not usually 
disposed to put much emphasis on the diachronic perspective, but to study and 
understand culture’s long-term role, not to mention the ability to explain 
causality, we do need systemic reflection that goes beyond the rather confined 
and present-oriented focus that characterizes speech act and performance 
analysis. Just as importantly, to comparatively investigate constitutional law, 
 
 41. Id. at 419–20. 
 42. Id. at 418–20. 
 43. See, e.g., JAQUES DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY 158 (Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak 
trans., The Johns Hopkins University Press 1976). 
 44. SUSAN SONTAG, ILLNESS AS METAPHOR AND AIDS AND ITS METAPHORS 3, 3 (Anchor 
Books ed., Doubleday 1990) (1978). 
 45. See, e.g., Derrida, supra note 43. 
 46. Eppinger, supra note 3, at 420–22. 
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broader systemic concepts are required in order to even envision the yardstick 
we need to assess the commensurability of different constitutions in their 
different cultural contexts. Finally, we need some sort of a systemic concept of 
the whole, not fragments, to anticipate any broader conclusions of our 
comparative analysis. 
Cultures are hard to define and exceedingly difficult to capture; they are 
multifarious, subtle, crafty, and deceitful entities. It is too easy to dismiss their 
existence and replace them with Derridan fluctuations of vacuum, or with 
assemblages of disembodied, individual acts. There are other ways of 
disentangling this challenge. For instance, it is quite possible to envision a non-
naïve concept of reality that acknowledges the investigating scholar’s 
influence—through the representations employed—on the narrative being 
produced. Jerzy Topolski has usefully suggested that we do so by 
distinguishing as clearly as possible between three levels of a narrative: the 
informative, the persuasive (rhetorical), and the ideological (controlling).47 
Similarly, it is also possible to fashion a concept of non-absolute, non-final 
truth that accepts the existence of many versions of the reality being 
investigated, without rejecting the very notion of truth as nothing more than a 
metaphysical millstone.48 
In curious but mutually consistent ways, cultures and constitutions share a 
similar raison d’être. To operate as engines that organize people’s lives, they 
both depend on imagined reality. They both rest on the fiction that their 
provisions are timeless, stable, true, even absolute (no de-centering for them). 
They both seek to force humans to conform to their presence and demands. 
They both cannot exist without proper respect for their authority (imagine the 
unwritten British constitution without the deference and authority accorded to 
it). In all this, they are both capable of absorbing and containing diverse and 
even contradictory ingredients in non-contradictory ways. It is this set of 




 47. Topolski, supra note 37, at 9. 
 48. See id. 
 49. On the enabling mechanisms of constitutions, see JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING 
ORIGINALISM 4–5 (2011). On the structuring power of cultural symbols, see PIERRE BOURDIEU, 
LANGUAGE AND SYMBOLIC POWER 166 (John B. Thompson ed., Gino Raymond trans., 1995). 
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